This paper presents a novel proxy convertible multi-authenticated encryption (multi-AE) scheme and its variant with message linkages. The proposed scheme allows two or more original signers to cooperatively delegate their signing power to an authorized proxy signer, such that the proxy signer can generate a valid authenticated ciphertext on behalf of the original signing group and only a designated recipient is capable of decrypting the ciphertext and verifying its embedded proxy multi-signature. Its variant with message linkages further benefits the encryption of a large message by dividing it into many smaller message blocks. The proposed proxy convertible multi-AE scheme and its variant can simultaneously fulfill the security requirements of confidentiality and authenticity. Thus, they are applicable to those group-oriented confidential applications with proxy delegation, e.g., proxy on-line auction, proxy contract signing and so on. In case of a later dispute over repudiation, our proposed scheme also allows a designated recipient to convert the ciphertext into an original proxy multi-signature for public verification. In addition, the security of confidentiality against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and that of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) are proved in the random oracle model.
quirements simultaneously be achieved. A straightforward way would be sign-then-encrypt [36] . Yet, the approach is costly in terms of computation efforts and communication overheads. In some special circumstances, a proxy might be properly delegated to conduct these confidential transactions, e.g., proxy auctions and the contract signing by an authorized proxy signer. Consider group-oriented applications such as the joint account owned by two or more individuals. To withdraw money from such account, all owners must cooperatively sign the withdrawal form which can only be verified by the bank teller. In case that account owners are unable to sign personally, they can delegate their signing power to a proxy signer who can legitimately conduct transactions on behalf of them. It thus can be seen that the design of efficient and provably secure cryptographic schemes fulfilling such requirements is crucial and benefits to the practical implementation.
Related Work
In 1996, Mambo et al. [25, 26] extended the concept of digital signature and introduced the notion of proxy signatures. A proxy signature scheme allows the original signer to delegate his signing power to an authorized person called proxy signer, such that the proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original one. As to the proxy delegation, it can be categorized into four different kinds as follows: (i). Full delegation [25, 26] : The proxy signer uses the private key which is the same as the one of the original signer so that all (proxy) signatures are signed with the same private key. Consequently, it is difficult for a verifier to identify the real signer from a given signature. That is to say, it cannot provide secure mechanisms to protect any one of the original and the proxy signers from being framed by the other.
(ii). Partial delegation [25, 26] : The proxy private key is further derived from the original signer's one based on some cryptographic assumptions, e.g., the factorization and the discrete logarithm problems. It is infeasible to compute the original signer's private key from the proxy one. Yet, it needs an additional revocation protocol as no information (e.g., the period of validity) is bonded to the delegation. Moreover, a malicious original signer can easily impersonate the proxy signer by deriving the corresponding proxy private key. (iii). Delegation by warrant [28, 37] : A warrant which contains necessary proxy information, e.g., the period of validity and the identifiers of the original and the proxy signers, could be regarded as the delegation authorization. The warrant is then delivered to the proxy signer for convincing anyone. However, transmitting and verifying the certificate will incur extra computational and communicational costs. (iv). Partial delegation with warrant [16] : This approach integrates the merits of partial delegation and delegation by warrant. It is also computationally infeasible for a proxy signer to derive the original signer's private key from the proxy one. Besides, to certify the warrant and validate the signature can be simultaneously carried out within a single step, which helps reducing the computational and communicational costs. Obviously, the fourth approach, partial delegation with warrant, is more flexible and secure as compared to the first three. Because of its efficiency and security compared with the others, we also adopt partial delegation with warrant to implement the proposed scheme. Up to the present, lots of variations of proxy signatures have been proposed [10, 12-14, 16, 23, 33, 34, 36] . In 1994, Horster et al. [8] proposed an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme which further provides digital signature schemes with the property of confidentiality and only the designated recipient can verify the signature instead of everyone. Since only the designated recipient has the ability to decrypt the ciphertext and verify the corresponding signature, there might be a potential drawback that the signer repudiates his signature. In such a circumstance, it is even difficult for an arbitrator to judge who is lying. To deal with the case of a later dispute over repudiation, Araki et al. [1] proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme. However, the signature conversion of their scheme requires the assistance of the signer and incurs additional computation efforts, which is considered to be inefficient and unworkable if the signer is unwilling to cooperate with. Moreover, Zhang and Kim [48] also pointed out that their scheme can not withstand a universal forgery attack on an arbitrary chosen message.
In 2002, Wu and Hsu [40] proposed a convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme, in which the Information Technology and Control 2017/4/46 532 signature conversion is rather simple and can be solely done by the recipient without any computation effort or communication overhead. Huang and Chang [11] proposed an enhanced scheme in the next year. However, both the Wu-Hsu and the Huang-Chang schemes cannot fulfill the security requirement of confidentiality, i.e., the ciphertext is computationally distinguishable with respect to two candidate messages. To eliminate such a security weakness, Lv et al. [24] proposed a secure and practical solution. In 2005, Wu et al. [41] proposed generalized CAE schemes and adapted these schemes based on elliptic curves [17, 25] for facilitating gradually popular applications like smart cards [7] , mobile phones and PDAs. Since then, lots of related works [6, 21, 35, 39, 43] have been proposed. In 2008, Chien [3] proposed a selectively CAE scheme allowing either the signer or the designated recipient to perform the signature conversion. In the next year, Lee et al. [19] addressed a CAE scheme based on the ElGamal cryptosystem. Considering the RSA cryptosystem, Wu and Lin [44] also presented a CAE scheme based on RSA in 2009. Nevertheless, these schemes are not suitable for the environment of multi-user setting. To fulfill group-oriented application requirements, Wu et al. [42] proposed a convertible multi-authenticated encryption (CMAE) scheme which enables a signing group composed of multiple signers to generate a valid authenticated ciphertext. In 2010, Tsai et al. [34] removed the necessity of using one-way hash functions. Based on Wu et al.'s scheme, Chang [2] addressed another variant with shared verification of multiple designated recipients. In 2012, Lu et al. [22] presented a provably CMAE scheme for generalized group communications. Later, Wu et al. [46] addressed a publicly verifiable PCAE scheme for confidential applications with proxy delegation. In 2014, Wu and Lin [45] proposed a proxy CAE scheme based on RSA. In 2015, a revocable CAE scheme [20] is also introduced. Yet, none of the above group-oriented CAE schemes can deal with the issue of proxy delegation. Although Lai and Singh [18] had proposed a similar scheme called IDbased multi-proxy multi-signcryption could solve the same problem, their scheme incurred time-consuming bilinear pairing operations and required extra key escrow mechanism.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we elaborate on the merits of CAE schemes and proxy multi-signature schemes to propose a novel proxy convertible multi-AE scheme and its variant with message linkages. The proposed scheme allows a delegated proxy signer to generate a valid authenticated ciphertext on behalf of the original signing group, such that only a designated recipient can recover the message and verify its embedded proxy multi-signature. When the case of a later dispute over repudiation occurs, a designated recipient can solely convert the authenticated ciphertext into a publicly verifiable proxy multi-signature without extra computation or communication cost. Besides, we further propose a variant with message linkages to benefit the encryption of a large message. We also prove that the proposed scheme achieves the security requirement of confidentiality against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and that of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) in the random oracle model. As compared with related works, the proposed scheme not only provides better functionalities, but also has the provable security.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe the parties participating in the proposed scheme and define the composed algorithms.
Parties
Without loss of generality, there are (n + 2) parties participating in a PCMAE scheme including a signing group (composed of n original signers), an authorized proxy signer and an intended recipient. All parties act as probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTM). The original signers will deliver proxy credentials to the proxy signer. The latter is responsible for producing an authenticated ciphertext on behalf of the former. Yet, a dishonest proxy signer might repudiate his ciphertext. Finally, the intended recipient has the ability to decrypt the ciphertext and verify the embedded proxy multi-signature. A PCMAE scheme is said to be correct if the authorized proxy signer can generate a valid authenticated ciphertext and only the intended recipient is capable of decrypting it and verifying the proxy multi-signature.
The Proposed PCMAE Schemes
We give a concrete construction of our PCMAE scheme in this section. Also, a variant with message linkage for manipulating a large message will be presented. The used notations are stated as Table 1 . Detailed steps for each algorithm are shown as follows:
Basic Construction
_ Setup: Taking as input a security parameter k, the system authority (SA) selects two large primes (p, q) and a generator g of order q, where |q| = k and q | (p -1). Let
k be collision resistant hash functions. The system's public Step 1 U i ∈O first chooses t i ∈R Z q to compute
and then sends Ti to Up and Uj  O, for j  i.
Step 2 Upon receiving all Tj's, Ui computes
where mw is the warrant consisting of the identifier of the original and proxy signers, the delegation duration and so on.
(i, mw, T) is then sent to Up.
Step 3 Upon receiving (i, mw, T), Up verifies
If it does not hold, (i, mw, T) is requested to be sent again.
We show that the verification of Eq. (4) 
and then delivers the authenticated ciphertext  designated recipient Uv. 
If the authenticated c correctly generated, it will From the right-hand side o
and then sends T i to U p and U j ∈ O, for j ∈ i.
Step 2 Upon receiving all T j 's, U i computes
where m w is the warrant consisting of the identifier of the original and proxy signers, the delegation duration and so on. (s i , m w , T) is then sent to U p .
Step 
and then delivers the warrant mw and the authenticated ciphertext  = (Q, S, R, T) to the designated recipient Uv.
-Uncover-verify (UV): Upon receiving , Uv first computes C as Eq. (7) and derives K as
He then recovers the message as
and checks the redundancy embedded in m. Uv can further verify the proxy multi-signature by checking if
The correctness of Eqs. (12) and (13) 
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) = m (by Eq. (8) and (10)) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12).
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) = m (by Eq. (8) and (10)) (6) .
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) = m (by Eq. (8) and (10)) (7) .
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) (8) .
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) (9) .
The correctness of Eqs. (12) and (13) (10) and then delivers the warrant m w and the authenticated ciphertext d = (Q, S, R, T) to the designated recipient U v . _ Uncover-verify (UV): Upon receiving d, U v first computes C as Eq. (7) and derives K as
The correctness of Eqs. (12) and (13) can be easily confirmed. From the right-hand side of Eq. (12), we have
) (by Eq. (11)) (12) and checks the redundancy embedded in m. U v can further verify the proxy multi-signature by checking if
(by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7)) = m (by Eq. (8) and (10)) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12) .
If the authenticated ciphertext (Q, S, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (13) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have
(by Eq. (9)) (13) The correctness of Eqs. (12) and (13) can be easily confirmed. From the right-hand side of Eq. (12), we have
If the authenticated ciphertext (Q, S, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (13) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have (9)) by Eq. (11) . mod ) (
If the authenticated ciphertext (Q, S, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (13) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have (9)) by Eqs. (4), (6) and (7) . mod ) (
If the authenticated ciphertext (Q, S, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (13) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have (9)) by Eq. (8) and (10) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12) .
If the authenticated ciphertext (Q, S, R, T) is correctly generated, it will pass the test of Eq. (13) . From the right-hand side of Eq. (13), we have (9)) by Eq. (9) C Rg σ = (by Eq. (5)) ) (mod p RT = (by Eqs. (2), (4) and (6)) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (13).
When a later dispute over repudiation occurs, Uv
can reveal the converted proxy multi-signature Ω = (S, R, T, K), the warrant mw and the original message m to prove the proxy signer's dishonesty without any additional cost. Thus, anyone can verify the converted proxy multi-signature with the assistance of Eqs. (7) and (13).
Variant with Message Linkages
Consider the practical implementation that the original message may be large. It therefore will cause the difficulty in encryption. In the subsection, we propose a variant with message linkages to benefit the encryption of a large message by dividing it into lots of small message blocks. The construction is similar as that in Section 3.1. We only describe the different parts as follows:
-Proxy-sign (PS): For signing a large message m on behalf of the original signing group O, Up first divides the message m into n pieces, i.e., m = m1 || m2 || … || mn, mi's ∈GF(p), and then chooses r ∈R Zq and w0 = 0 to compute R, σ, C, K and S as Eqs.
(5) to (9) . Up further computes 
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When a later dispute over repudiation occurs, U v can reveal the converted proxy multi-signature W = (S, R, T, K), the warrant m w and the original message m to prove the proxy signer's dishonesty without any additional cost. Thus, anyone can verify the converted proxy multi-signature with the assistance of Eqs. (7) and (13).
Variant with Message Linkages
Consider the practical implementation that the original message may be large. It therefore will cause the difficulty in encryption. In the subsection, we propose a variant with message linkages to benefit the encryption of a large message by dividing it into lots of small message blocks. The construction is similar as that in Section 3.1. We only describe the different parts as follows: (5) to (9) . U p further computes 
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polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the DLP with the advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance with a given security parameter k and over the random choices of A. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem; CDHP
Let p and q be two large primes satisfying that q | p − 1, and g a generator of order q over GF(p). The computational Diffie-Hellman problem is, given an instance (p, q, g, g a , g b ) for some a, b ∈ Zq, to derive g ab mod p.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Let Ik = {(p, q, g) ∈ I | |p| = k} with k ∈ N, where I is the universe of all instances and |p| represents the bit-length of p. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the CDHP with the advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance with a given security parameter k and over the random choices of A. (10*) and delivers the warrant m w along with d = (S, R, T, w 1 , w 2 , …, w n ) to the designated recipient U v . _ Uncover-verify (UV): Upon receiving it, U v first derives C and K as Eqs. (7) and (11), respectively. He then computes 
polynomial P(⋅) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the DLP with the advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance with a given security parameter k and over the random choices of A. (12*) and recovers the original message m as m 1 || m 2 || … || m n . U v can further verify the proxy multi-signature by checking Eq. (13) .
We show that with the authenticated ciphertext (S, R, T, w 1 , w 2 , …, w n ) and the warrant m w , the designated recipient U v can recover the message m and check its validity with Eq. (12*). From the righthand side of Eq. (12*), we have
(b E (10* by Eq.
(10*)
= mi (mod p) which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12*). A(y, p, q, g) = Log p, q, g(y) ,
polynomial-time algorithm
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently chosen instance with a given security parameter k and over the random choices of A. which leads to the left-hand side of Eq. (12*).
Security Proof and Comparison
In this section, we briefly review the security notions, state the security model and prove the security of our proposed scheme. Some comparisons with related schemes are also made.
Security Notions Discrete Logarithm Problem; DLP
Let p and q be two large primes satisfying q | p -1, and g a generator of order q over GF(p). The discrete logarithm problem is, given an instance (y, p, q, g), where y = g x mod p for some x ∈ Z q , to derive x.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption
Let I k = {(p, q, g) ∈ I | |p| = k} with k ∈ N, where I is the universe of all instances and |p| represents the bitlength of p. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P(×) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the DLP with the advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
Let I k = {(p, q, g) ∈ I | |p| = k} with k ∈ N, where I is the universe of all instances and |p| represents the bit-length of p. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial P(×) and all sufficiently large k, the algorithm A can solve the CDHP with the advantage at most 1/P(k), i.e.,
Security Model
The security requirements of the proposed PCMAE scheme and its variant are message confidentiality and unforgeability. The widely accepted notion for the security of message confidentiality comes from the definition of indistinguishability-based security, i.e., the adversary attempts to distinguish a target ci- 
Definition 4. (Unforgeability) A PCMAE scheme is said to achieve the security requirement of unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA) if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with non-negligible advantage in the following game played with a challenger B:
Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm and sends the system's public parameters params to the adversary A.
Phase 1:
The adversary A adaptively makes CG and PS queries as those in Phase 1 of Definition 3.
Forgery:
Finally, A produces an authenticated ciphertext d* which is not outputted by the PS query. The adversary A wins if d* is valid.
Security Proofs
We prove the security of our proposed scheme in the random oracle model as Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. The security proofs can be also applied to its variant with message linkages, since they have almost the same structure.
Theorem 1. (Proof of Confidentiality) The proposed scheme is (t, q h
1 , q h 2 , q h 3 , q CG , q PS , q UV , e
)-secure against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in the random oracle model if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that can (t', e')-break the CDHP, where
Here t l is the time for performing a modular exponentiation over a finite field. Fig. 1 depicts the proof structure of this Theorem. Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can (t, q h 1 , q h 2 , q h 3 , q CG , q PS , q UV , e)-break the proposed scheme with non-negligible advantage e under the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack after running in time at most t and asking at most q h i h i random oracle (for i = 1 to 3), q CG CG, q PS PS and q UV UV queries. Then we can construct another algorithm B that (t', e')-breaks the CDHP by taking A as a subroutine. Let all involved parties and parameters be defined the same as those in Section 3.1. The objective of B is to obtain (g x p x v mod p ) by taking (p, q, g, y p , y v ) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a challenger to A in the following game. [1] = T) y.
Proof:
r; simulations of CG and PS queries to be perfect. Then we evaluate the simulation of UV queries. From the algorithms of O-Sim_UV, we find out that it is possible for an UV query of some valid d = (Q, S, R, T) to return the error symbol ¶ on condition that A has the ability to produce d without asking the corresponding h 2 (m l , C, K, R) or h 3 (K) random oracles in advance. Let UV_ERR be the event that an UV query returns the error symbol ¶ for some valid d during the entire game, AC-V an event that the authenticated ciphertext d of a UV query made by A is valid. QH 2 and QH 3 separately denote the events that A has ever asked h 2 (m l , C, K, R) and h 3 (K) random oracles beforehand. Then we can express the error probability of any UV query as Since A can make at most qUV UV queries, we can further express the probability of UV_ERR as
Additionally, in the challenge phase, B has returned a simulated authenticated ciphertext δ* = (Q*, S*, R*, T*) where T* = yp σ C mod p, which implies the shared secret K* is implicitly defined as (yv σ )
x v mod p. Let GP be the event that the entire simulation game does not abort. Obviously, if the adversary A never asks h2(mλ, C, K*, R*) or h3(K*) random oracles in Phase 2, the entire simulation game could be normally terminated. We denote the two events that A does make an h2(mλ, C, K*, R*) and h3(K*) query in Phase 2 by QH2* and QH3*. 
If the event (QH2* ∨ QH3*) happens, we claim that K* = (yv σ ) x v mod p will be stored in some entry of the Q_h2 or the Q_h3 array. Consequently, B has non-negligible probability The computational time required for B is t' ≈ t + tλ(2q CG + 4q PS + 3q UV ).
Q.E.D.
In 2000, Pointcheval and Stern introduced the Forking lemma [29] to prove the security for generic digital signature schemes in the random oracle model. If we apply their techniques to prove our scheme, we can also obtain the generic result as follows. Since A can make at most q UV UV queries, we can further express the probability of UV_ERR as
Pr[λ′ = λ | GP] = 1/2. 
In 2000, Pointcheval and Stern introduced the Forking lemma [29] to prove the security for generic digital signature schemes in the random oracle model. If we apply their techniques to prove our scheme, we can also obtain the generic result as follows. (14) Additionally, in the challenge phase, B has returned a simulated authenticated ciphertext d* = (Q*, S*, R*, T*) where T* = y p s C mod p, which implies the shared secret K* is implicitly defined as (y v s )
x v mod p. Let GP be the event that the entire simulation game does not abort. Obviously, if the adversary A never asks h 2 (m l , C, K*, R*) or h 3 (K*) random oracles in Phase 2, the entire simulation game could be normally terminated. We denote the two events that A does make an h 2 (m l , C, K*, R*) and h 3 (K*) query in Phase 2 by QH 2 * and QH 3 *. When the entire simulation game does not abort, it can be seen A gains no advantage in guessing l due to the randomness of the output of the random oracle, i.e.,
In 2000, Pointcheval and Stern introduced the Forking lemma [29] to prove the security for generic digital signature schemes in the random oracle model. If we apply their techniques to prove our scheme, we can also obtain the generic result as follows. triples (σ1, h, σ2) can be simulated without knowing the private key with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another machine which has control over the (15) 
Recall that in Definition 3, A's advantage is defined
By assumption, A has non-negligible probability ε to break the proposed scheme. We therefore have
can also obtain 
can also obtain the generic 
More concretely, in obtain two equations belo
By combining the abov further derive the private k
On the other hand, we can also derive that 
By assumption, A has non-negligible probability ε to break the proposed scheme. We therefore have 
By combining further derive t xp = (S − (17) With inequalities (16) and (17), we know that
By combining further derive t xp = (S − (18) Recall that in Definition 3, A's advantage is defined as Adv(A) = | Pr[l′ = l] − 1/2 |. By assumption, A has non-negligible probability e to break the proposed scheme. We therefore have
by Eq. (18) Combining Eq. (14) and rewriting the above inequality, we get'
and solve the CDHP. The computational time required for B is t'  t + t(2q CG + 4q PS + 3q UV ).
Q.E.D.
In 2000, Pointcheval and Stern introduced the Forking lemma [29] to prove the security for generic digital signature schemes in the random oracle model. If we apply their techniques to prove our scheme, we can also obtain the generic result as follows.
(The Forking Lemma) In the random oracle mode, If the event (QH 2 * ∨ QH 3 *) happens, we claim that K* = (y v s ) x v mod p will be stored in some entry of the Q_h 2 or the Q_h 3 array. Consequently, B has non-negligible probability
In 2000, Pointcheval and Stern introduced the Forking lemma [29] to prove the security for generic digital signature schemes in the random oracle model. If we apply their techniques to prove our scheme, we can also obtain the generic result as follows. Still, to give a tight reduction from the hardness of DLP to our proposed scheme, we present another more detailed security proof and the advantage analysis as Theorem 2. Here t l is the time for performing a modular exponentiation over a finite field. Fig. 9 depicts the proof structure of this Theorem. Suppose that A is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can (t, q h 1 , q h 2 , q h 3 , q CG , q PS , e)-break the proposed scheme with non-negligible advantage e under the adaptive chosen-message attack after running in time at most t and asking at most q h i h i random oracle (for i = 1 to 3), q CG CG and q PS PS queries. Then we can construct another algorithm B that (t′, e′)-breaks the DLP by taking A as a subroutine. Let all involved parties and notations be defined the same as those in Section 3.1, h 3 a collision resistant hash function and (h 1 , h 2 ) random oracles. The objective of B is to obtain ) log ( p g p y x = by taking (p, q, g, y p ) as inputs. In this proof, B simulates a challenger to A in the following game.
Proof:
Setup:
The challenger B runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm to obtain the system's public parameters params = {p, q, g} and comes up with a random tape composed of a long sequence of random bits. Then B simulates two runs of the proposed scheme to the adversary A on input params, y o , y p , y v = g α mod p where α ∈ R Z q , and the random tape.
Phase 1:
A adaptively asks h 1 and h 2 random oracles, CG and PS queries as those defined in Theorem 1. Analysis of the game: According to the analyses of Theorem 1, the simulations of CG and PS queries are perfect. Namely, the adversary A can not distinguish . Then, we can express the probability that A outputs a valid forgery d = (Q, S, R, T) after asking the corresponding random oracles as Pr[AC-V ∧ ¬NH] ≥ (e -2
-2k
).
With the initially selected private key α, B can recovers m and obtain the multi-proxy signature (S, R, T, K) along with m w . Then B launches the second simulation. He again runs A on input params, y o , y p , y v = g α mod p where α ∈ R Z q , and the same random tape. Since the adversary A is given the same sequence of random bits, we can anticipate that the i-th random query A asks will always be the same as the one in the first simulation. In the second simulation, B returns identical results as those he responds in the first time until A makes the h 2 (m, C, K, R) query. At this time, B directly gives another answer v 2 *∈R Z q rather than original v 2 . Meanwhile, A is then supplied with a different random tape which also consists of a long sequence of random bits. From the statement of "Forking lemma", we can learn that when A finally makes another valid forgery d* = (Q*, S*, R, T*) where h 2 (m, C, K, R) ≠ h 2 *(m, C, K, R), B could solve the DLP with non-negligible probability. To analyze B's success probability, we use the "Splitting lemma" [29] described below: Let X and Y be the sets of possible sequences of random bits and random function values provided to A before and after the h 2 (m, C, K, R) query is issued, respectively. It follows that on inputting a random value (x || y) for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, A returns a valid forgery with the non-negligible probability e, i. If we let ρ ∈ D and y′ ∈ Y separately be the supplied sequences of random bits and random function values before and after A makes the h 2 (m, C, K, R) query, A is able to make a valid forgery in the second simulation with the probability of at least (2 , the probability of B to solve the DLP in the second simulation can be represented as e' ≥ (e -2 Moreover, the computational time required for B in one simulation is t' ≈ t + t l (4q CG + 8q PS ).
According to Theorem 2, the proposed scheme is secure against existential forgery attacks. That is, the proxy private key can not be forged and the delegated proxy signer can not repudiate having generated his authenticated ciphertext. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement of non-repudiation.
Comparisons
We compare the proposed scheme with some related works including [34] and the Lin-Yeh (LY for short) [22] schemes in terms of functionalities and security proofs. Detailed comparisons are demonstrated as Table 2 . Since WHT and Cha schemes also have provable security, we further compare our work with them in terms of computational efforts which is evaluated by the number of required modular exponentiation operations. The performance comparison is demonstrated as Table 3 . From these tables, it can be seen that the proposed scheme provides not only better functionalities, but also lower computational costs.
